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Foreign Direct Investment in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe: An ‘eclectic’ 
approach to Greek investments 
 
Abstract 
The fall of communism in Central, Eastern and Southern Eastern European countries 
(CESEC) has presented multinationals with new trade and investment opportunities. Since 
early 1990s the CESECs countries embarked on a transition process aimed at democratisation, 
achieving improved standards of living, setting up a functioning market economy and 
becoming full members of the EU or at least building closer political and economic relations 
with the organisation. Within this context, during the last decade Greece has emerged as one 
of the largest investors in the Central and Eastern and South Eastern European Countries.  
Greek firms making the most of their geographical proximity and capitalising on their cultural 
and commercial links with CESECs are heavily investing in those countries.  This is the first 
paper to empirically evaluate the determinants of entry mode decisions of Greek firms 
participating in the Athens Stock Exchange. The main aim of the paper is to investigate 
foreign direct investment determinants using Dunning’s eclectic paradigm.  Our results offer 
strong support to the eclectic framework and suggest that it is the interrelation of ownership 
and locational advantages that can explain foreign investment activity. 
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Foreign Direct Investment in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe: An ‘eclectic’ 
approach to Greek investments 
 
1. Introduction 
The fall of communism and the opening up of markets in Central, Eastern and 
Southern Eastern European Countries (CESEC) has presented multinationals with immense 
trade and investment opportunities. The transition economies offered a wide range of 
advantages, including a large and unsaturated potential market in terms of population and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a cheap and relatively skilled labour force and accessible and 
low-priced natural resources. Furthermore, improvements in the institutional framework, 
political stability and the prospects for European Union (EU) membership have acted as 




The remaining South Eastern European, primarily Balkan, or former Soviet Union 
countries have also targeted foreign investors for their potential positive impact on their 
economies. Large multinational enterprises (MNEs) have increasingly expanded into Central, 
South and Eastern Europe and names such as General Motors, Nestlé, British Petroleum, 
Orange and Marks and Spencer’s are common place in the area. In a world characterized by 
ongoing globalisation where accelerated technological progress, new production, 
organizational and management systems and a constantly growing role of competition 
constitute the main features, it is imperative for countries and enterprises to be internationally 
competitive in order to survive and grow (World Investment Report, 2002). 
Despite the significant fall of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the CESECs, from 
USD 31 bn. in 2002 to a low of USD 21 bn, the new EU members  are likely to experience a 
‘second wave’ of FDI from investors aiming to reap the advantages of these countries’ 
changed location advantages (World Investment Report, 2004: 69, 79).  This stylised fact 
makes the continuous investigation of foreign investors’ behaviour in CESECs a necessity. 
                                                 
1
 We call the ‘Agenda 2000’ countries the ten Central and Eastern European countries which  were part of the 
EU accession process in 1997 and whose progress towards EU membership was assessed by the European 
Commission through the ‘Agenda 2000’. These include: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 5 
This study covers this gap by primarily focusing on FDI located in that region and by bringing 
into the discussion the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries.  It is important to 
understand that as the process of EU expansion covers these countries as well as the recently 
accessed countries the competition for FDI attraction will become intensive. 
 Since the early 1990s the CESECs countries embarked on a transition process 
that aimed at democratisation, achieving improved standards of living, setting up a 
functioning market economy and becoming full members of the EU or at least building closer 
political and economic relations with the organisation.  Whilst the above hold for the region 
as a whole, the distribution of FDI is highly uneven among the countries due to their different 
transition progress. The vast majority of FDI has been received by the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, which were the first to begin liberalisation and the largest among the 
region. While Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia have had high inflows relative to 
GDP for some years, Poland and Latvia have been experiencing growing inward investment 
only recently (Holland and Pain, 1998). Bulgaria and Romania have received much lower 
levels of FDI due to their relatively poor progress in meeting the economic conditions for 
their accession to the EU (Bevan et al., 2001). Their share of total FDI in the region, though, 
the last couple of years has risen from 28% in 2002 to 45% in 2003 (World Investment 
Report, 2004:70).  FDI in countries of the former Soviet Union  has only took off in 1995 
with Russia being by far the  leading recipient before the economic crisis of summer 1998 
which depressed investment temporarily (Meyer and Pind, 2004:205).  South Eastern Europe 
has seen low investment for the most part of the nineties with a recent positive trend as a 
result of privatization deals. Although these do not match the size of previous deals in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, during 2001-2003 the Republic of Moldova, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  (FYROM) and Serbia and Montenegro were the region’s 
leaders regarding the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation (World Investment Report, 
2004:70).  These significant differences can be attributed to the different transitional paths 
and the especially the significant differences in the institutional environment of the countries 
in the region.  Political stability, democratisation, rule of law, bureaucratic quality and the 
existence of corruption and ethnic tensions can significantly influence an investor’s decision 
to engage or not in investment activity.  This comes as the second significant contribution of 
the paper.  We include in our analysis of investors’ behaviour, variables that capture the 
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above mentioned factors and thus offering a more holistic approach to FDI behaviour.  As the 
institutional environment might be the most important factor affecting international investors’ 
decisions, it is imperative to examine its effect on investment decisions. 
 Within this context, during the last decade Greece has emerged as one of the largest 
investors in the Central and Eastern and South Eastern European Countries (Demos et al., 
2004).  Firms located in Greece, either purely domestic firms or Greek subsidiaries of large 
multinational organisations, making the most of their geographical proximity and capitalising 
on their cultural and commercial links with CESECs are heavily investing in those countries 
(Iammarino and Pitelis, 2000).  This transformed Greece from a peripheral European country 
to a regional centre, especially in its neighbouring South-eastern European countries.  Greek 
firms grabbed the opportunities, mentioned above and expanded rapidly in the newly opened 
markets.  Indicative are the cases of Albania, where Greece was the second largest investor 
after Italy at the end of 2001 (WIIW, 2005); Romania, where it was the second
 
largest 
investor at the end of 2003 (WIIW, 2005); Bulgaria, with Greece on the third position (WIIW, 
2005); FYROM, where it was the second investor following Hungary (WIIW, 2005) and 
finally Moldova where Greece holds the seventh place (WIIW, 2005).  Data from the Hellenic 
Ministry of National Economy (1998) show that Greek investment in the Balkan region 
accounts for almost 12% of the total FDI.   
As mentioned previously, the Greek investment in the region occurred through two 
channels.  Firstly, purely domestic firms, ranging from small entrepreneurial to large 
traditional firms, seized the opportunities and engaged in foreign production by using their 
accumulated experience and expertise.  Secondly, Greek subsidiaries of multinational 
enterprises started internationalising and upgrading their roles.  Firms such as 3E, a Coca- 
Cola soft drinks subsidiary, Delta, partner of Danone, Intracom, a partner of Siemens working 
in  telecommunications, Chipita, a PepsiCo food subsidiary and many others started investing 
abroad, thus becoming regional headquarters and upgrading their role in the multinational 
group. This strategic change appears to be verified by a prior study of Kyrkilis and Pantelidis 
(1994) where they argue that ‘it is possible for foreign subsidiaries to readjust their market 
strategies along time and in accordance with changing conditions’. 
 This is where this paper makes its third contribution.  Using a holistic framework, that 
captures aspects of the institutional environment, empirically evaluates the determinants of 
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entry mode decisions of Greek firms participating in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) in a 
geographical area of great interest to MNEs.  The rational behind explaining the behaviour of 
Greek firms does not come only from the obvious Greek presence in the region but mostly 
from the existing need in the international business literature to identify and explain the 
investment motivations of firms coming from small peripheral economies in their 
internationalisation process.  Greece is an excellent example of how a small peripheral EU 
economy upgraded its role and became a significant regional outward investor. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the theoretical 
formulation and the supporting literature.  Section 3 presents the data set and some basic 
statistics of our sample. We present the methodology in section 4 whilst our empirical 
analysis and results can be found in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we draw several 
conclusions and suggest areas for further investigation. 
 
2. Theoretical formulation 
In order to examine investors’ behaviour, this paper builds on Dunning’s (1977; 1988; 
1993) eclectic paradigm.  The justification for using this theoretical framework over any other 
international business framework comes from the paradigm’s eclectic and holistic attributes.  
This framework allows the investigator to include in the analysis, not only firm level variables 
but also location specific variables that can encapsulate the institutional environment.  The 
need to synthesize various aspects of the approaches of MNEs and FDI and the desire to find 
an appropriate framework for their empirical investigation led to the emergence of the original 
eclectic paradigm.  For the last two decades, the eclectic paradigm has remained the most 
influential analytical framework for MNEs.   
According to Dunning (1996), there are four types of foreign investors: resource 
seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking and strategic asset or capability seeking. These 
motives are also defined by UNCTAD (1998:91) as economic determinants of FDI and are 
complemented by the host country’s policy framework and capacity for business facilitation. 
Policy framework refers here to the degree of social and political stability,  rules regarding 
entry and operations, fair competition between foreign and domestic investors, privatisation 
policy, international agreements on FDI an the host government’s attitude toward foreign 
corporations (UNCTAD, 1998). 
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Dunning’s (1977; 1988; 1993)  eclectic paradigm, known mostly as Ownership-
Location-Internalisation  (OLI)  paradigm,  has emphasised that the returns to FDI, and hence 
FDI itself, can be explained by the competitive-ownership advantages of firms  (O), 
indicating who is going to produce abroad ‘and for that matter, other forms of international 
activity’  (Dunning, 1993:142), by locational factors  (L)   ‘influencing the where to produce’  
(Dunning, 1993:143) and by the internalisation factor  (I)  that ‘addresses the question of why 
firms engage in FDI rather than license foreign firms to use their proprietary assets’ 
(Dunning, 1993:145).  The above propositions provide the framework for explaining the 
scope and geography of value added activities.   
 The first proposition incorporates within the ownership or competitive 
advantages (O) of firms seeking to engage in FDI variables such as property rights, intangible 
assets and specialised management capabilities, organizational and marketing systems, 
innovatory capabilities (Dunning, 1993:142). The second proposition includes within the 
specific locational characteristics (L) of alternative countries or regions the following:  low 
input prices, productive and skilled labour force, well-developed infrastructures, investment 
attraction policies and country level innovatory competences (Dunning, 1993:143).  
Previous studies on CESEC suggest that the key location-related FDI determinants are 
demand, cost factors and the risk of investment, in terms of both political and economic 
environment (Lucas, 1993; Singh and Jun, 1995; Holland and Pain, 1998; Bevan and Estrin, 
2004). In particular, risk assessment has been especially important for the transition countries 
which have faced internal economic and political crises (Henisz, 2000). Indeed political 
instability discourages foreign investment (Lucas, 1990). Executives report that political 
instability is the most important factor they consider when internationalising, apart from 
market potential. A recent survey conducted by the World Bank (2005) also identifies 
‘economic and regulatory policy uncertainty’ as a major obstacle for business, particularly in 
countries lagging behind in terms of economic and political reforms, although not exclusively. 
This shows the need to use more specific risk variables, including the expropriation risk 
suggested by Bevan and Estrin (2004:784) and which is included in the present study. 
The third proposition of OLI has to do with the internalisation (I) advantages. It 
actually mirrors the extent to which enterprises consider to internalise activities rather than 
get involved in arm’s length operations.  Exploiting market failures is the main argument 
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behind this type of benefits.  Lowering search and negotiation costs, controlling for market 
imperfections and compensating for the absence of future markets are a few internalisation 
incentive advantages (Dunning, 1993). 
An emerging strand of research has dealt with the impact of institutions on FDI 
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Resmini, 2001; Disdier and Mayer, 2004) and on enterprise 
strategies, notably their entry modes (Oxley, 1999; Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Smarzynska, 
2002). According to Kogut and Spicer (2002) and Stiglitz (1999) the establishment of new 
institutions is more important, for international investors, comparable to more conventional 
macroeconomic policy objectives. The quality of institutions influences the strategies of 
previously state-owned companies before and after privatisation (Peng, 2000; White and 
Linden, 2002), the creation of new firms (McDermott, 2002) and the strategies of foreign 
investors (Henisz, 2000). Empirical studies have included variables such as government 
policy (Gomes -Casseres, 1991), intellectual property protection (Oxley, 1999) or economic 
freedom (Brenton, Di Mauro and Lücke, 1999). 
 The paradigm asserts that it is the combination of ownership, locational and 
internationalisation factors and their exact configuration that defines which firms become 
MNEs, when they do so, where they locate their productive activities and how they involve in 
international production.  Dunning (2000) himself characterized the eclectic paradigm ‘as an 
envelop for complementary theories of MNC activity’. The configuration of the eclectic 
paradigm is though context specific.  Despite its generality in explaining multinational 
activity, one has to clearly identify the geographical region under investigation, the industry 
and of course the firms examined.  As Dunning (2001) puts it:  ‘In formulating operational 
hypotheses about the relationship between individual OLI variables and the level and pattern 
of international production, it is important to specify the context in which this relationship is 
being examined.’ Thus, OLI advantages work as a ‘tripod’ in explaining multinational activity 
and act both as initiative and a mechanism of accomplishing an FDI project.  This is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 A very recent and influential contribution belongs to Dunning (2004) himself, who 
discusses extensively the role of institutional infrastructure in upgrading the pull factors 
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determining the competitive advantages of countries and regions, examining the European 
transition economies. He then moves on to discuss two major empirical exercises with respect 
to the significance of institutional and policy related variables for these economies. Closely 
related to that is the work of Carstensen and Toubal (2004), where they integrate traditional 
with transition-specific variables in a dynamic panel model comprising of FDI flows from ten 
OECD countries to seven Central and Eastern European hosts.  
This paper enriches an emerging research dealing with location determinants of FDI in 
transition economies (Lankes and Venables, 1996;  Holland and Pain, 1998; Meyer and Pind, 
1999;  Resmini, 2000; Bevan, Estrin and Grabbe, 2001;  Krkoska, 2001; Bevan and Estrin, 
2004; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004) and complements it by looking at the interplay 
between location advantages, including variables that capture the institutional environment,  
and ownership advantages in determining the internalisation method of Greek companies.  
 In this paper, we define a set of specific factors included in the OLI paradigm.  We use 
a subset of the several variables proposed by the eclectic framework but at the same time the 
most representatives for multinational firms’ motives (Dunning, 1993).  The application of the 
OLI framework will allow us to discern differences in the internalisation decisions of firms 
engaging in international investment activity.  We then assume that OLI factors not only vary 
per individual investment but also the spectrum of OLI factors should lead to a non-negative, 
non-zero sum, which should maximise firm returns in order to engage in  FDI. This is in the 
line with the notion that OLI advantages are resources able to generate income (Dunning, 
1993:77).  Although other forms of international expansion, such as trade, require the 
existence of L and to some extent O advantages it is clear that for a firm to get involved in 
FDI the combination of these advantages must lead to the maximisation of firm’s profits 
compared to other alternative means of foreign market entry.   
 The main assumption of the study is that ownership advantages and political 
institutional factors, as part of the location advantages, represent catalysts for MNEs’ decision 
to locate in the CESECs.  We then simultaneously test in a combined framework the O and L 
advantages.  We perform our analysis using an expanded time period thus capturing partially 
the changes in the O and L advantages of Greek firms and CESECs respectively.  Within the 
locational advantages of the OLI framework, we use political institutional variables. This is 
consistent with the fact that although scholars concentrated initially on factor endowments, 
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especially labour costs and productivity (Bevan et al, 2004:45),  recently multinationals have 
increasingly focused on ‘created assets’ (Narula and Dunning, 2000) including knowledge-
based assets, infrastructure and institutions of the host economy. According to Mudambi and 
Navarra (2002:636), institutions are important determinants of FDI because they ‘represent 
the major immobile factors in a globalised market … Legal, political and administrative 
systems tend to be internationally immobile framework whose costs determine the 
international attractiveness of a location. Institutions affect the capacity of firms to interact 
and therefore affect the relative transaction and co-ordination cost of production and 
innovation’. 
2.1.a. Location Advantages - Institutional Variables 
According to Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) differences in the predictability of 
the institutional framework may partially explain the differences in FDI across economies in 
transition. However, this is only partially confirmed by Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004). 
They find that institutions alone do not contribute substantially to explaining the cross-
country variation of FDI-inflows. Instead, they argue that FDI decisions require simultaneous 
improvements in markets, internationalisation and institutions.  
Whilst all Central and Eastern European countries have dramatically changed their 
legal frameworks since 1990, this process varied greatly amongst countries and often the 
implementation of the law lagged behind (Peng, 2000). These countries being constrained by 
the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria in order to join the EU,  have made  relatively faster 
progress in improving their political institutions including tackling corruption, enforcing the 
rule of law, lessening the bureaucratic burden, avoiding ethnic tensions and eliminating 
expropriation risks. These are the variables used in this study and are described in Appendix 
1.  Nevertheless, this progress was highly differentiated (EBRD, 2001).  
 Poor institutions increase search, negotiation and enforcement costs, thus hindering 
the establishment of new business relationships and the initiation of new transactions (Antal 
Mokos, 1998; Meyer, 2001).  
A survey by the World Bank (2005) indicates that firms still perceive corruption as an 
important obstacle in doing business in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, despite them 
being invited to join the EU most probably in 2007.  However, the literature on FDI and 
corruption usually finds inconclusive evidence on their relationship. Using Transparency 
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International’s ‘Corruption Perception Index’, Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) find that 
countries that have a more equitable system of rule of law, lower corruption and more  
freedom in economic activity  achieved much better performance than countries that are 
characterised by significant deficiencies. Hines (1995) failed to find a negative correlation 
between corruption and total FDI, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found inconclusive evidence 
about corruption and US FDI, whilst Wei (2000) found a negative relation but with a sample 
dominated by OECD countries.   
Investors are also deterred by legal instability and bureaucratic and administrative 
barriers (OECD, 1994). A recent survey conducted by the World Bank (2005) identifies the 
low ‘confidence in the judiciary system’ as a major obstacle for business, particularly in 
countries lagging behind in terms of economic and political reforms, although not exclusively.  
FDI can also be discouraged by increased bureaucracy where investment permits, registration 
or screening are required or where sectoral restrictions and barriers exist (Alter and Wehrle, 
1993). Under profit-maximisation assumption, high incentives and law barriers would 
increase the profitability of the firm, and high bureaucracy levels would have a negative 
impact on foreign investors (Wei, 2000). Using an FDI policy variable based on content 
analysis of several governmental provisions with respect to incoming FDI, Bandlej (2002) 
finds that foreign investors in Central and Eastern Europe are not attracted by financial 
incentives. She argues that this could be a result of the poor implementation of such 
provisions or of the possibility that further incentives are given on a case by case basis. These 
results indicate the need for a more appropriate measurement of the FDI related institutional 
framework as proposed in this study.  
 Although the  World Bank Survey (2005) shows that ‘business licensing and permits’ 
are  increasingly less of a  concern for firms investing in Central and Eastern Europe, possibly  
as a result of  trade and investment liberalisation undertaken here, ‘the inconsistency of 
official’s interpretations of regulations’, a proxy for bureaucracy levels,  remains a significant 
barrier to business. The present analysis builds on Adam and Filippaios (2006) who using the 
IRIS (2000) measure of the quality of the local bureaucracy,  also used in the present study,  
find that higher levels of bureaucratic quality enhance FDI, especially in non-OECD countries 
as compared to OECD countries. 
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 The collapse of communism created not only political and legal instability, but it 
sometimes unleashed civil disorder and war as a result of ethnic tensions. If investors seek to 
minimise the risk, then they would avoid locations with high ethic tensions. Although the 
World Bank Survey (2005) does not mention this variable as a perceived business deterrent 
by MNEs, it does include a related variable such as ‘crime, theft and disorder’ as a political 
barrier. 
 Finally,  Bevan and Estrin (2004) suggest that the  expropriation risk should be used as 
a risk related variable potentially more meaningful for foreign investors than the country 
sovereign risk. Furthermore, in a study of determinants of US FDI in 105 developing and 
developed countries for 1989-1997, Adam and Filippaios (2006) find that lower levels of 
expropriation enhance FDI, especially in non-OECD countries as compared to OECD 
countries. To a certain extent the institutional political variables used in this study mirror 
the variables in the World Bank Survey (2005) which were perceived by firms as potential 
business barriers, thus supporting our choice of location FDI determinants. 
2.1.b. Location Advantages – Economic Variables 
To complement the institutional variables used we also use a set of economic variables 
suggested by the international business literature in order to account for the different types of 
motives companies may pursue (Dunning, 1993).  This list is not extensive and it is used only 
to capture the general aspects of the macroeconomic environment.  The effect of a country’s 
market size on investment decisions is the most widely tested hypothesis in previous studies 
of FDI determinants. There has been a direct relationship between the current size (Gross 
Domestic Product) of a country's national market and new investments by MNEs 
(Braunerhjelm and Svenson, 1996; Culem, 1988, Barrell and Pain, 1997; Wheeler and Mody, 
1992).  In addition to that direct relationship, an indirect supplement to the hypothesis is that 
larger host markets are more appealing to potential investors as economies of scale are more 
likely to be captured in local production (Krugman, 1979; Amiti, 1998), so that the option of 
supply through trade (other constraints on trade assumed constant) is more readily foregone. 
Openness (OPEN) as defined by exports plus imports over total trade could be either 
substituting or complementing for FDI (Markusen 1984; Torstensson, 1998).  This variable 
describes the competitiveness position of country in terms of international trade and exposure.  
One particular dimension of this variable needs to be stressed here.  High level of 
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competitiveness accompanied with price advantages can support FDI strategies aiming at 
wider markets than the country itself.  Concentration of production in the most efficient 
location but still targeting the whole region is the most pervasive depiction of this investment 
behaviour. 
2.2 Ownership Advantages 
 The second set of factors we use represents the ownership advantages of the investing 
firms. Size is an obvious ‘transaction cost minimising O advantage’ (Dunning, 1993, Table 
4.1:81) which however is transformed into an I advantage as it depicts the continuous 
internalization of previously external markets under common governance and management 
(Dunning, 1993:79).  In various empirical studies, size tends to favour multinationality (Horst, 
1972 a,b) and we thus expect a positive relationship with FDI.  In a previous study, Buckley 
and Pearce  (1979) emphasise the role of size, arguing that large firms tend to service foreign 
markets through FDI rather than trade. Numerous other studies have tested firm-level 
characteristics include that of Juhl (1979) and Grubaugh (1987) who also found that size 
favoured multinationality. On the other hand though, there are studies like the one by Hoesch 
(1998) revealing an opposite effect. In his study on German investment in Central Eastern 
Europe (CEE) he found that it is small, in employment terms, German firms that tend to 
penetrate through FDI in the CEE markets instead of other developed European markets.  
R&D intensity raises the probability of a firm to expand internationally.  Through FDI 
firms tend to accumulate new technologies when old technologies become outdated (Shan and 
Song, 1997).  Ownership advantages emerge primarily via two channels for the firm.  On the 
one hand it is the possession of proprietary assets and on the other the actual ability of the 
firm to acquire or coordinate assets (Cantwell, 1989; Teece, 1992; Dunning, 1993).  We 
would expect a positive relationship between R&D intensity and FDI, but this relationship 
might be different for various internalisation methods.  
Profitability also has an impact on firms’ decision to invest.  Profitable firms not only 
show a more efficient way of organising activities but also create the available resources for 
the future expansion (Cantwell and Sanna-Randaccio, 1993). 
Multinationals usually are in a better position to raise capital, either domestically or 
internationally.  This leads to financial assets advantages which reinforce multinationality 
(Dunning , 1993: 162). 
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Administration costs and distribution costs fall under the category of economies of 
common governance. Caves (1996) used variables capturing the organisation of the 
multinational group, providing support for firm related variables and their effect on 
investment decisions.  The high administration costs can also capture a particular aspect of the 
resource based view of the firm (Penrose, 1956 and 1959) suggesting that the firm’s 
expansion is directly linked with its managerial resources. 
 
3. Data and sample description 
Our sample consists of 177 manufacturing firms enlisted in the ASE, both under 
purely domestic ownership and subsidiaries of foreign MNEs.  We decided not to include 
firms belonging to the Banking and other Financial intermediation sectors as their motives 
can be significantly different when investing abroad and the definition of foreign expansion is 
much more difficult to be given.  In the period 1992 -1999, 33 of out of those 177 firms 
engaged in an investment or investments and thus were qualified for testing. This led to a total 
of 46 foreign investments decisions.  The selection of firms that were enlisted in ASE is 
related with data availability issues.  Those firms are obliged to announce every investment 
activity and thus it is easy to identify the investment’s characteristics.  That being said, the 
firms enlisted in ASE are the largest, in terms of turnover and size, and the most competitive 
in the Greek economy, thus forming the backbone of economic activity.  
Figure 2 provides a mapping of the investment activity abroad, by presenting the 
absolute number of subsidiaries established in each country.  Similar to the data presented in 
the introduction, that cover the total of Greek investment activity abroad, firms in our sample 
have a significant presence through foreign affiliates in Romania, Bulgaria and FYROM.  The 
case of Romania deserves a special comment as from the total of 46 foreign investments, 
almost 30% are concentrated there.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
 In order to provide further evidence on the internationalisation process of Greek firms 
abroad, Table 1 presents the time pattern of expansion for our sample by host country.  There 
is a clear upward trend towards the late nineties and the chi-square confirms the existence of a 
statistically significant relationship between the period that an investment was undertaken and 
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the selection of the host country.  Having acquired experience and knowledge of their 
neighbouring markets, Greek based investors injected capital more confidently in these 
economies in the mid-1990’s. This is compatible with the theory of internationalisation 
(Johansson and  Vahlne, 1997).   
Insert Table 1 here 
Similar are the conclusions drawn from table 2 that presents investments by host 
country and mode of entry.  Acquisitions and joint ventures are the most commonly used 
entry modes.  Greenfield investments are quite popular for foreign expansion and are also 
more equally spread within the country sample. Other types of strategic alliances as 
management control of operations are less favoured.  The existence of a statistically 
significant relationship between the two qualitative variables confirms that the selection of 
country is not independent from the selection of entry mode and vice versa. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Finally, an interesting aspect of the internationalisation process is also presented in 
table 3.  The technological intensity
2
 of the mother company is related to the selection of the 
host country.  Romania and Russia are the only two markets that manage to attract high 
technology investments, whilst as expected the Balkan markets are dominated by low 
technology and usually labour intensive investments.   
Insert Table 3 here 
 
4. Methodology  
To get further insights on the factors that affect the decision making process of 
investing abroad we decided to proceed in two ways.  Firstly, we wanted to explore the 
factors that affect foreign investments decisions.  According to our theoretical formulation 
and the underlying eclectic paradigm, ownership and locational factors, alongside the 
market’s internalisation benefits will determine whether and consequently how a firm will 
invest abroad.   
                                                 
2
 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals & Cosmetics were classified as high technology sectors, whilst low technology 
sectors include Construction Materials, Flour Mills, Food & Drink, Metals, Packaging, Textiles and Various. 
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Our first step was to identify which factors increase the probability of a firm becoming 
an MNE.  Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable taking the value one (1) for the 
firm and the time period that there was a foreign investment and zero (0) otherwise.  We used 
a binary logit regression
3
 and we present our results in table 4.  We gradually progressed in 
adding the locational variables to the model to prove our point that the ownership advantages 
of the firm on their own only partially explain the firms’ decisions.  As a second step we 
wanted to apply the same framework, i.e. the eclectic paradigm, to the mode of entry and 
explore whether the factors suggested by the eclectic paradigm can explain the decision to 
enter a market using different ownership structures.  The three basic modes used in this paper 
are joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions and Greenfield investments.  We did not include 
other managerial deals as their nature might be more complicated and not necessarily 
explained by the eclectic framework.  Because the process is neither sequential nor the 
outcomes, i.e. the investment decisions are ordered, we used a similar estimation method to 
the one used by Cragg and Uhler (1970)
4
. The major concern with multinomial logit 
regression is the violation of the independence of irrelevance alternatives.  For this reason the 
test suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1984) was used to test the consistency of our 
estimates.  The performed test, presented in Appendix 2, failed to reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients differ systematically.  Thus the hypothesis cannot be rejected and the use 
of multinomial logit generates consistent and efficient estimates. 
 
 5. Empirical analysis and results 
Our empirical exercise is performed in two steps.  The first step investigates the 
investment determinants for firms involved in international investments.  The base group 
consists of firms without any investment activity.  Table 4 presents the determinants for 
foreign investments.  
Insert Table 4 here 
As a first step we examined only the firm’s ownership advantages as explanatory 
variables for investment decisions.  Size and Research & Development intensity affect 
positively the decision of a firm to invest abroad. Large firms, committed to the creation of 
                                                 
3
 For a further explanation on the binary logit regression see Maddala (1983). 
4
 For a further explanation on the multinomial logit regression see Maddala (1983). 
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new knowledge show a higher probability to invest internationally.  On the other hand a high 
leverage ratio produces a negative effect in the investment decision, probably due to the 
already large exposure of firm to borrowing.  The leverage ratio though is statistically 
significant only in model 3, our full model.  Administration costs have a negative sign, 
statistically significant in model 1 only.  High management costs reduce the probability to 
expand internationally.  Finally, distribution channels as captured from distribution expenses 
over total sales affect positively the investment decision.  The picture is different when we 
add the location variables in the model.  The basic change comes from the explanatory power 
of the augmented model.  Both measures of fit, the Wald Chi-square and the Log Pseudo 
Likelihood show a significant improvement.  Again, the firm’s size and R&D intensity seem 
to dominate the explanatory power of the ownership advantages.  The existence of well 
organised, highly competent distribution channels for the firm acts as a facilitator for 
investments in foreign environments.  Striking somehow are the results for the locational 
factors.  Market size has a negative effect whilst openness to trade affects in a positive way 
FDI.  A possible explanation comes from the efficiency seeking motive of Greek investors 
who invested in Central Eastern and South Eastern European countries in order to exploit the 
low labour costs and then re-export their products either back to Greece of to other countries.  
Greek firms do not invest in CESECs for exploitation of the local market but rather for local 
production and then re-exportation of the products to Greece or other European markets. 
Among the institutional variables, capturing the overall environment in the countries under 
examination, corruption has a negative effect, which means that the higher the corruption in 
the country the more probable for a firm to undertake FDI.  This as it may seem strange in the 
first instance has an explanation if someone takes into consideration that OLI as we 
mentioned is context specific.  Greek firms are used to operate in environment with high 
levels of corruption, thus they might prefer to operate in a similar environment.  On the other 
hand Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality and Expropriation risk have all their hypothesised 
positive sign, though only expropriation risk is statistically significant.  The negative sign for 
ethnic tensions although is not the one supported by our theoretical formulation, can be 
explained from the overall Greek investment activity.  Greek firms invested heavily in Balkan 
countries with large ethnic tensions, as Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), FYROM and 
Albania.  Greek firms are used to operate in environments with characteristics that would 
 19 
deter any other international investor and thus the existence of ethnic tensions might have this 
positive effect. 
Our second step is directly related with the internalisation method of expanding 
abroad.  Table 5 presents the results for the different internalisation methods.  The benchmark 
group is again firms that did not get involved in any investment activity. 
Insert Table 5 here 
The picture is different and now we can clearly see a mixture of ownership and 
location factors affecting the mode of entry.  Size is again important only for M&As and 
Greenfield investments whilst leverage ratio has a positive and significant effect on JVs and 
M&As.  This implies that firms with a higher ratio of foreign to own capital prefer entering 
new markets through creating partnerships and thus sharing the potential risks of expansion. 
Profitability on the other hand becomes important with a negative impact on JVs and M&As.  
More profitable firms have the necessary resources to invest on their own and this is mirrored 
in the positive sign for Greenfield, thus they avoid entering into partnerships.  Finally, R&D 
intensity changes sign and becomes negative and significant for JVs and M&As.  This again 
suggests that firms, value dissemination of information issues and transaction costs involved 
in those types of investments.  When it comes to the location variables again there is a 
different pattern.  Market size is negatively affecting M&A and Greenfield investments.  This 
can be an indication of increased competition.  Again in this specific context of the eclectic 
paradigm, large markets tend to be dominated be other European or US firms, thus making 
competition more difficult.  Entering in those markets without a local partner or at least by 
sharing the risk might be non profitable.  Rule of law is extremely important for the JVs.  The 
well defined legal and regulatory framework facilitates sensitive investment decisions through 
JVs.  Finally, expropriation risk is positive and significant in M&As suggesting that firms 
engaging in this kind of activity have something more to loose than just their resources. 
 
6. Conclusions and further research  
The main aim of the paper was to investigate Greek investments in CESECs using 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm.  Our results offer strong support to the eclectic framework and 
suggest that it is the interrelation of ownership and locational advantages that can explain 
foreign investment activity.  Using a sample of Greek firms, enlisted in the Athens Stock 
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Exchange, we investigated the ownership and location determinants of the internalisation and 
internationalisation process.  Greece is one of the leading investors in Central, Eastern and 
South Eastern European Countries, thus understanding the process that determines Greek 
investments in the region is of crucial importance for policy makers.  On the other hand our 
results showed that it is primarily locational specific advantages that determine the firm’s 
investment decision and the ownership advantages that primarily determine the mode of entry 
or the internalisation method.  The analysis of the institutional environment has a significant 
contribution in explaining foreign investment activity. 
This paper is a first attempt to explain the Greek experience when investing abroad.  
Further insights could be given first of all with an extended time sample.  Another interesting 
aspect would be to determine the different factors that affect investments in various sectors.  
Finally the augmentation of the sample with Greek investments world-wide could give us a 
clear answer whether the investments undertaken in the Central, Eastern and South Eastern 
Countries had something unique or they are just part of the process that led Greece becoming 
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Figure 1. The tripod of eclectic paradigm 
 
 
Figure 2. Mapping Greek Investments abroad 
Table 1. Investments by host country and year of investment (% of Total) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Grand Total 
Albania 2.2     2.2   2.2 6.5 
Bulgaria 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 13.0  21.7 
FYROM    6.5  4.3 2.2 13.0 
Georgia Republic      2.2  2.2 
Hungary       2.2 2.2 
Moldova 4.3 2.2     6.5 
Poland   2.2  2.2   4.3 
Romania   6.5 2.2 2.2 10.9 10.9 32.6 
Russia    2.2    2.2 
Ukraine      2.2  2.2 
Serbia & Montenegro   2.2  4.3   6.5 
Grand Total 8.7 15.2 13.0 13.0 32.6 17.4 100.0 
       Chi-square 67.45** 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10% 
 












Albania   4.35 2.17  6.52 
Bulgaria 15.22 2.17 4.35  21.74 
FYROM 6.52 2.17 4.35  13.04 
Georgia 
Republic     2.17 2.17 
Hungary   2.17   2.17 
Moldova   2.17 4.35  6.52 
Poland   4.35   4.35 
Romania 21.74 6.52 4.35  32.61 
Russia   2.17   2.17 
Ukraine    2.17  2.17 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 2.17 2.17 2.17  6.52 
Grand Total 45.65 28.26 23.91 2.17 100.00 
     
Chi-Square 
71.77*** 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10% 
 
Table 3. Investments by host country and technological intensity of sector of 
participation of  the mother company  (% of Total) 
 Low Technology High Technology Grand Total 
Albania 6.52   6.52 
Bulgaria 21.74  21.74 
FYROM 13.04  13.04 
Georgia Republic 2.17  2.17 
Hungary 2.17  2.17 
Moldova 6.52  6.52 
Poland 4.35  4.35 
Romania 26.09 6.52 32.61 
Russia   2.17 2.17 
Ukraine 2.17  2.17 
Serbia & Montenegro 6.52  6.52 
Grand Total 91.30 8.70 100.00 
   Chi-Square 15.77* 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 4.  Foreign Investment Determinants 
Comparison Group = No investment 
Binary Logit estimation with robust standard errors 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Variable    
Firm Variables 
Size 0.168*** 0.714** 0.893 
 (0.01) (0.36) (0.57) 
Leverage -0.025 -0.002 -0.115** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) 
Profitability -0.040 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&DIntensity 16.125 13.907 16.924*** 
 (12.44) (9.71) (5.74) 
AdministrationCosts -0.273*** -0.238 -0.422 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
DistributionChannels 2.400** 4.227*** 6.614*** 
 (1.06) (1.11) (1.54) 
Location Economic Variables MarketSize  -0.373*** -0.428** 
  (0.07) (0.18) 
Openness  0.343*** 0.339** 
  (0.10) (0.15) 
Location Institutional Variables Corruption   -5.660** 
   (2.73) 
RuleofLaw   1.379 
   (2.63) 
BureaucraticQuality   0.870 
   (1.38) 
EthnicTensions   -0.646 
   (2.13) 
ExpropriationRisk   2.131* 
   (1.14) 
Number of obs  1254 1251 1251 
Wald Chi-Square  454.18 159.76 255.44 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -183.45 -38.64 -15.71 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** significant at 1% 
** significant at 5% 
* significant at 10% 
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Table 5. Comparison of Mode of Entry for Foreign Operations 
Comparison Group = No investment 
Multinomial Logit estimation with robust standard errors 
  Joint Ventures M&A Greenfield 
 Variable    
Firm 
Variables 
Size 0.044 2.773*** 2.441*** 
 (0.88) (1.14) (0.60) 
Leverage 0.185** 0.506*** -0.639 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.50) 
Profitability -0.391** -1.321* 0.037 
 (0.19) (0.68) (0.03) 
R&DIntensity -5.596* -1.191** 9.794 
 (3.25) (0.38) (7.65) 
AdministrationCosts -2.11 -5.86 -1.72** 
 (3.58) (20.93) (0.70) 
DistributionChannels -3.075 -0.064 1.485 




MarketSize -0.522 -1.545** -0.945** 
 (0.47) (0.66) (0.48) 
Openness 0.905** 0.88* 0.832* 




Corruption -19.609 -17.968 -20.742* 
 (12.73) (12.74) (12.96) 
RuleofLaw 21.349** 15.645 18.105 
 (12.71) (11.85) (12.15) 
BureaucraticQuality -5.211 -7.046* -3.643 
 (3.62) (3.75) (3.34) 
EthnicTensions -14.258** -14.588** -10.62* 
 (6.96) (6.75) (6.36) 
ExpropriationRisk 8.253 15.335* 7.303 














Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
*** significant at 1% 
** significant at 5% 
* significant at 10%
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Appendix1. Variable Description 
  Description Source 
Firm 
Variables 
Size Logarithm of Total Assets 
Annual Reports of 
Firms enlisted in 
Athens Stock 
Exchange (1991 – 
1999) and Authors’ 
Calculations 
Leverage Short and Long Term Debt over Own Capital As above 
Profitability Profits over Total Sales As above 
R&DIntensity Research and Development Expenses over Total Sales As above 
AdministrationCosts White Collar Salaries over Total Sales As above 






Real GDP in constant dollars        (expressed in 
international prices, base 1985.) 
World Table (Mark 
5.6) 
Openness 







Lower scores indicate "high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments" and that "illegal 
payments are generally expected throughout lower 
levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected 
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
 assessment, police protection, or loans."  
Values 0-6 
 
IRIS-3 File of 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Data 
RuleofLaw 
This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens 
of a country are willing to accept the established 
institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes."  Higher scores indicate:  "sound 
political institutions, a strong court system, and 
provisions for an orderly succession of power."  Lower 
scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on physical 
force or illegal means to settle claims."  Upon changes 
in government new leaders "may be less likely to 





High scores indicate "an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training," "autonomy from political 
pressure," and "strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 





This variable “measures the degree of tension within a 
country attributable to racial, nationality, or language 
divisions.  Lower ratings are given to countries where 
racial and nationality tensions are high because 
opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to 
compromise.  Higher ratings are given to countries 
where tensions are minimal, even though such 




This variables evaluates the risk "outright confiscation 
and forced nationalization" of property.  Lower ratings 
"are given to countries where expropriation of private 





Appendix 2. Independence of Irrelevance Alternatives 
 Observations Chi-Square Degrees of Freedom 
Foreign investments    
No investment 43 0.12 20 
Joint Venture 1187 4.88 17 
Merger& Acquisition 1178 3.43 22 
Greenfield investment 1186 1.36 9 
 
